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I.

Abstract
Truth and Reconciliation processes are key to rebuilding societies damaged by

broad-based, government-sanctioned violence by revising dominant cultural narratives of
the violence. In Indonesia, there has been no such process following the killings of
between 500,000 and 2 million suspected communists and others in 1965-66. This paper
is an exploration of conflict transformation theory, and of what form a truth and
reconciliation process might take in Indonesia following 50 years of impunity. Using
Joshua Oppenheimer’s 2012 and 2014 documentaries The Act of Killing and The Look of
Silence as primary reference points, I apply critical discourse analysis to look at how the
dominant narrative of the killings is upheld and discursively constructed, and at what
counter-narratives are emerging that could give rise to conflict transformation and
reconciliation. I ultimately offer an assessment of the readiness to take on such a process,
based on analysis of the films and other contextual materials, including journalism and
official documents regarding the killings.
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III.

Introduction
In 2009, I spent a year living in Jakarta, Indonesia, as a high school foreign

exchange student. Host families, teachers, and classmates embraced and supported me in
an unforgettable way. I fell in love with this wonderful country and have since strived to
learn as much as I can about Indonesia and its history. When Joshua Oppenheimer’s 2012
and 2014 documentaries The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence were screened in
theaters in my hometown, I rushed to see them. These films document massacres of
civilians in 1965 after the Indonesian government was overthrown by the military. Early
in the morning on September 30th, a group of “disaffected military officers” kidnapped
and assassinated six of the most senior army generals and attempted a coup, which failed
(McGregor). General Suharto crushed the coup and controlled the ensuing narrative,
placing blame for the plot on the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis
Indonesia- PKI) (McGregor). The army directed killings of PKI members and other
affiliated organizations, such as the Indonesian Women’s Movement. (McGregor).
Anyone opposed to the military dictatorship or suspected to be sympathetic to the PKI
could be accused of being a communist. This included union members, landless farmers,
ethnic Chinese, left-leaning political activists, and intellectuals (Killing; Cribb and Ford;
McGregor). At the local level, Suharto’s orders to purge communists became a license to
work out “old political, religious, and ethnic hatreds” (Parry 106). Astonishingly,
hundreds of thousands were tortured and executed without weapons of war, by hand
(106). In less than a year, between five hundred thousand and two million ‘communists’
were killed (Killing; Kwok, “Memory of Savage Anticommunist Killings”; McGregor).
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After the massacres, General Suharto continued to lead the country for 32 years,
until 1998. In some cases, the architects and perpetrators of the slaughter still hold
positions of power throughout the country, and are widely regarded as heroes given credit
for shaping Indonesia’s democracy (Killing). How can there possibly be a healthy
community, much less a democracy, in this situation, where killers triumph and retain
power for decades? The victorious murderers have subverted the truth to perpetuate the
myth of their heroism in the dominant narrative of Indonesia’s national identity.
The Act of Killing focuses on the perpetrators of the killings, The Look of Silence
on the victims. I had only heard briefly about these events during my time as an exchange
student. Comments made in passing, such as that communism was illegal in Indonesia,
constituted the glimpses I had of this turbulent chapter of Indonesian history. I was
shocked by the films, their portrayal of the culture of impunity for those who perpetrated
the violence, and the ongoing threats, intimidation, and violence against survivors that
still grip the country.
I am interested in processes that shape and define national narratives. The national
narrative of Indonesia is reaching an exceptionally fascinating juncture, in which counternarratives surrounding the massacres of 1965-66 are newly developing both within
Indonesia and on a global scale. The fifty-year anniversary of the massacres in October
2015, marked the following month by the convening of an International People’s
Tribunal for Indonesia in the Hague, placed the question of initiating a truth and
reconciliation process center-stage. Oppenheimer’s films explore what happens when
government actors and their civilian confederates enjoy impunity after widespread
executions of hundreds of thousands of civilians. The films are a compelling starting
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point for an analysis of fledgling counter-narratives as well as of the dominant narrative
memorializing the events of 1965-66. The Indonesian government has not officially
recognized these events as crimes. Though many of the people directly involved in the
massacres as executioners and survivors are still living, the window in which a truth and
reconciliation process involving them can take place is closing. Through this paper, I
draw on conceptual frameworks from the fields of conflict resolution, using critical
discourse analysis to examine the narratives of the killings presented by Oppenheimer’s
films for indications of readiness to change the dominant national narrative, and to
initiate a truth and reconciliation process in Indonesia.
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IV.

Review of Primary and Secondary Source Materials
1. Secondary Source Materials
a. Theory of Truth and Reconciliation Processes: Conflict Transformation
Truth and reconciliation processes have been conceived and executed in

numerous countries in response to episodes of unconstrained violence on a massive scale.
Processes in South Africa following the collapse of the apartheid regime and in Rwanda
in the wake of the genocide in 1994 are well known. Aspects of a truth and reconciliation
process were also instrumental in Germany after World War II and in Northern Ireland
after the peace accords. Guatemala undertook a Recovery of Historical Memory Project
to address the legacy of its decades-long civil war (Maddison 217). Truth and
reconciliation processes are complicated and varied projects. At the basis of any truth and
reconciliation process lies the question of which goals should be pursued, through which
particular institutional mechanisms, and in what order (Ciorciari and Ramji-Nogales
194). In the realm of conflict management and reparation after large-scale violence, these
processes are key to finding a way to confront the past and find healing and progress.
Objectives such as ‘peace,’ ‘justice,’ ‘healing,’ and ‘democracy’ drive these efforts
(Maddison 40).
Defining the province, methodology, and achievable objectives of truth and
reconciliation processes is a complex endeavor. Truth and reconciliation commissions
(TRCs) are not tools for addressing routine crimes, even when many victims are
involved. They are instead mechanisms used by governments to address wide-scale,
illegal violence committed, supported, enabled, or tolerated by governments. They are
also used to reunite societies after civil wars in which government forces have massacred
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civilians. As government apparatuses, TRCs bring legitimacy, power, access to
information, the means of designing and building memorials, influence with all
components of society, adequate funding, and the high profile required to change a
national narrative (Brahm).
In popular culture, TRCs are understood to be linear constructs in which events
unfold sequentially, beginning with fact-finding missions and ending with full societal
reconciliation. People know TRCs to be governmentally-created entities which have a
mandate to dismantle ahistorical national narratives by creating public fora in which
events of the past can be grappled with and new understandings can be reached to make
more positive relationships between the victims and perpetrators of violence possible
(Ciorciari and Ramji-Nogales 196). Victims are acknowledged and given a platform to
voice their grief and frustration. Perpetrators admit and explain wrongdoing and take
responsibility. A breach in the culture is thus healed, and the community can move
forward in peace and greater mutual understanding. To some extent, theorists accept this
popular conception as a workable definition. David K. Androff, introducing a discussion
of social work as a component of successful TRCs, defines TRCs as “a primary human
rights intervention for post-conflict reconstruction” (Androff 1960). He sees TRCs as
offering societies severely damaged by state-sanctioned violence a means to recovery
which is in some cases superior to merely “maintaining security, providing humanitarian
relief, promoting development, and seeking justice” (1961). In his view, TRCs provide
restorative justice by investigating past abuses, hearing the stories of victims and
perpetrators, and thus repairing the damaged social fabric (1960).
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Most scholars recognize a much more problematized theoretical framework for
truth and reconciliation processes. Some would likely dispense with the term “TRC” due
to its suggestion that a commission can accomplish repair and healing by conducting a
fact-finding investigation and holding hearings. Theorists such as Sarah Maddison think
of conflict characterized by violence on a massive scale—the kind of conflict which
necessitates truth and reconciliation processes—in terms of conflict transformation rather
than conflict resolution. Maddison disputes the theory of a cycle of conflict in which
latent social tensions find public expression, escalate, then deescalate and resolve with
post-conflict reconciliation (Maddison 23). This theory is fictitious in that it posits an end
to conflict and conceives truth and reconciliation processes as the means to reaching that
end. Maddison adopts the term “deeply divided societies” to describe communities
“emerging from periods of violence and civil war, or that have other significant cleavages
resulting from historical violence” (23). Maddison is cautious in her expectations from
truth and reconciliation processes as a response to such violence in that “the violent
conflict, repression, and injustice that make up the history of such societies are multilayered and multifaceted, making it virtually impossible to determine which wrongs can
feasibly be addressed, what this process might entail, and how to prioritize such efforts”
(23).
Conflict cannot be resolved by a truth and reconciliation process. Conflict is a
complex social phenomenon that is essential in shaping healthy democratic societies
(Maddison 23). Because of the persistent nature of conflict, reconciliation attempts do not
begin with a “blank slate,” but unfold in a context “laden with problematic historical
events that remain alive in contemporary consciousness and demand attention and
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recognition” (Little; Lederach, as qtd. in Maddison 57). In fact, the long-term
consequences of conflict are perpetual. The time never comes when “historical events or
practices have run their course and no longer influence evolving social and practical
relations” (Little, as qtd. in Maddison 58). The perpetuity of conflicts means that “they
are constantly being reiterated, renegotiated and reconstituted and thus their impact on
social and political structures is continual” (58). The “complex temporality” of conflict is
thus a crucial consideration in conflict transformation efforts (58).
Conflict should be contained, channeled, and made overt through social and
political processes that replace, and hopefully preclude, unconstrained violence. A
process that replaces a nonfactual official narrative with an oversimplified narrative
based on binaries of right and wrong, violated and violators, should be avoided
(Maddison 25). The truth about conflicts can rarely be so cleanly divided. Direct violence
may disappear temporarily or permanently, but structural and cultural violence arising
from the deep fault lines that produced the historical breach persist and continue to
produce marginalization, repression, and discrimination (Nadler, as qtd. in Maddison 27;
McGregor). Failure to successfully transform the conflict leaves open the possibility of
future episodes of unconstrained violence (27). Thus, the process must begin with a
correct understanding of the nature of conflict and with the objective of conflict
transformation. Maddison identifies the following elements, which must be interwoven
in designing a truth and reconciliation process.

b. The Role of Dialogue
All theorists emphasize the crucial role dialogue plays in any reconciliation
attempt. Dialogue, while seemingly simple, is a delicate procedure, and one that must be
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structured and guided towards constructive expression (Maddison 252). Emotions that
have been repressed must be allowed to be fully expressed and realized. Dialogue is
productive when managed in such a way that it can facilitate healing and be a starting
point for change, not just an airing of grievances and a further cause for contention. The
overarching goal of conflict transformation requires first a transformation in the way
people in deeply divided societies talk to each other (255).
Most importantly, dialogue must lead to “public policies and concrete actions
which can be measured” (Noriega, as qtd. in Maddison 267). The fact that it often does
not has led to perceptions that dialogue is an unproductive or unnecessary procedure, one
that succeeds in stirring up deep emotions while failing to realize its promises of change.
Committed parties from various sectors of civil society must be actively involved to help
balance and shape this outcome (267).“[M]eaningful conflict transformation” is
dependent on collaboration among individuals, government departments, and
communities committed to “patience, persistence, creativity, risk, tolerance, and
substantial investment over a long period of time” (269).
John D. Ciorciari and Jaya Ramji-Nogales illustrate an additional feature of
effective dialogue, which is that it must include diverse voices. They describe a process
carried out in Cambodia by the governmental organization Renakse (Salvation Front),
which conducted a nationwide review and condemnation of Khmer Rouge crimes
(Ciorciari and Ramji-Nogales 200). The organizing committee held a series of
community meetings at which victims gave testimonies about the brutality they faced and
witnessed (200). Renakse unearthed mass graves and examined documents to collect
evidence of damage done to both people and property by the Khmer Rouge (200).
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Victims were invited to sign petitions detailing these atrocities (200). Although this
process appeared to be truth commission-like in its methods (that is, gathering
information to present a different version of the truth, inviting victims to speak, and
bringing perpetrators to justice), the Renakse process was ineffective because it did not
include any Khmer Rouge voices (201). Due to this exclusion, no “genuine dialogue”
took place “between former foes” (214). The community meetings “did little to
encourage public apologies that could have facilitated healing” (214), and as a result,
victims and perpetrators had no opportunity to humanize one another (201).
Another defect in the dialogue fostered by Renakse was that the findings were not
shared with a broad audience (Ciorciari and Ramji-Nogales 201). Structured dialogues
put on by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), a hybrid
tribunal combining domestic and international laws, procedures, and personnel (205-6) at
the community level provided greater public awareness of information and fostered
conversation about Khmer Rouge atrocities (206, 214). Perhaps most importantly, the
ECCC-sponsored dialogues “created a space for victims and perpetrators to interact, and
fostered understanding and forgiveness” (214).
In order to successfully anticipate further processes, one purpose of dialogue must
be to explore the “preferences of those who need to be reconciled” (Ciorciari and RamjiNogales 216) in regard to the truth and reconciliation process as a whole. The role of civil
society is to “build neutral, non-political forums for truth telling involving genuine
dialogue between survivors and perpetrators” (216). Well-structured dialogue “can
humanize complex historical conflicts and enable former adversaries to engage positively
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with one another” (216). Through dialogue, a shared understanding of the events of the
past, the responsible parties, and the victims may be achievable.

c. Memory and Memorialization as Precursors or Companions to Reconciliation
Another important precursor to reconciliation is an agreement on a shared account
of history and a new approach to how the original violence will be remembered. As
complex as truth and reconciliation processes are to design and execute, they are a crucial
means of challenging ahistorical national narratives regarding violent social breaches on
a massive scale. It is not enough to forget the past and move forward. The obscured past
atrocity “will continue to constrain all efforts to construct a more democratic society until
the nation develops an understanding of how [the victims of violence] experienced and
internalized state and insurgent structures of terror as part of their individual and
collective identities” (Sanford, as qtd. in Maddison 29). Even after decades, the
experience of genocide persists in the national psyche as “an officially silenced national
trauma reverberating throughout the society” (29).
Truth recognition processes, such as the Recovery of Historical Memory Project
in Guatemala, are a crucial first step in confronting atrocities that have been officially
denied or mischaracterized. “Establishing a shared truth about past collective violence
and human rights abuses is seen as a ‘prerequisite for achieving accountability,
meaningful reconciliation, and a foundation for a common future’” (Chapman, as qtd. in
Maddison 49). Acknowledgement of “huge violations of people’s human rights” must
precede reconciliation and conflict transformation efforts (Hunt, as qtd. in Maddison 44).
The process of developing a shared narrative, of listening to others state their
understandings of the past, and creating an account of a “chaotic and painful past” (161)
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is an important first step in reconciliation efforts, and lays the groundwork for greater
efforts to manage conflict and begin healing. Some theorists caution that a universally
shared understanding of the meaning of the facts may never be achieved. Fortunately, “A
shared moral account of the nature of past wrongs” is not an indispensable prerequisite to
moving forward (Schaap, as qtd. in Maddison 51).
The challenge of finding a shared national narrative about atrocities is particularly
daunting in circumstances like Indonesia’s, where a truth and reconciliation process is
emerging in a context of impunity. While reconciling people is certainly the ultimate
goal, it is not always the best place to start (Opotow 161). Opotow proposes first
addressing “the contingencies of justice”—what happened in the past, who is responsible,
and why these events happened in the first place (161-2). A single interpretation of the
past is not expected to be agreed upon, but parties do need to be “mutually tolerant of a
limited set of interpretations [...] a shared narrative may, therefore, require revising their
preexisting narratives or reinterpreting their earlier experiences” (161).
The question of how high the level of agreement on the facts and their meaning
has to be in order to ultimately succeed in conflict transformation is a perplexing one.
Clearly, the dominant national narrative cannot continue to be rankly nonfactual. Factual
accounts cannot continue to be faltering acts of narrative insurgency. The absence of a
shared understanding of the past violence and its causes “reinforces the sense of isolation
and difference between the two communities, underscoring the persistent threat of
violence and impeding other reconciliation efforts” (McCaughey; Community Relations
Council, as qtd. in Maddison 210). The critical mass of narrative agreement is
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particularized to a given society, but if it is not achieved, neither will conflict
transformation be achieved (210).
In post-conflict societies, the dominant narrative is usually under the control of
elites. For some theorists, the goal of TRCs is to replace the dominant narrative, which
serves the purposes of elites and protects their power and privileges, with a narrative
reflecting the lives of marginalized populations (Maddison 208). Such counter-narratives
“refuse to allow past injustice to be excused as incidental to the nation-building agenda”
(208). Little posits a far less ambitious goal when he says, “...reconciliation efforts
should not focus so much on the discovery of one ‘truth’ but on how accommodation
between conflicting historical accounts might be attained in order to ‘make a conflict
more liveable’” (Little, as qtd. in Maddison 210).
A companion effort to the retrieval of the facts and fashioning of a narrative is the
memorialization of the story that emerges. Memorialization arises from memory, but also
reaches back to reinforce the narrative that produces it. Murals and memorials in
Guatemala, for example, “‘[do] vital memorializing work’ to help ‘create a public,
shared, and fixed rendering of the mass experience of violence’” (Nelson, as qtd. in
Maddison 245). A larger scale museum memorializing the victims from both sides of the
Guatemalan civil war is being constructed in a building that formerly housed the secret
police archives (246). In addition to presenting information about historical genocides
and other Latin American Cold War counterinsurgency wars, this museum will provide a
“shrine space” to mourn the victims and casualties of the war, many of whom do not have
a grave that can be visited on Dia de los Muertos (246). Julio Solórzano-Foppa, one of
the architects of this project, finds it fitting “to carry on the tradition of building
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memorials ‘in places where violations of human rights occurred’” (Solórzano-Foppa, as
qtd. in Maddison 246). Such repurposing of public space for memorialization of the
ascendant narrative seems best suited to societies in which there is a high level of
agreement about the facts and their meaning.
Where widespread resistance to a new national narrative regarding atrocities may
exist, more inclusive memorials may have a better chance of being successfully
embedded in the consciousness of the community. For example, in Cambodia, stupas—
“Buddhist religious monuments used for worship and remembrance” (Ciorciari and
Ramji-Nogales 201)—have been constructed where surviving family members can pray
for the spirits of the dead. Possibly due to the sheer numbers of perpetrators, the
Cambodian experience of successful memorialization has been with less divisive
projects. “Ceremonies and memorials have been more conducive to healing when they
have focused on sharing communal suffering and honoring loved ones rather than
focusing enmity on perpetrators and their kin” (215).
Another consideration in memorialization is the local community. It is “at the
local level that most people experience conflict,” and the local level is where “the
chances of reconciliation are greatest, because people know both each other and the
issues at hand” (Wessels, as qtd. in Maddison 248). Impactful memorializations in
Cambodia have been created in communities and have drawn on local culture and
religion, “appealing to Buddhist principles of tolerance and forgiveness” (Ciorciari and
Ramji-Nogales 215). Similarly, in a project called ‘Re-Imagining Communities,’ the Arts
Council of Northern Ireland has replaced hundreds of murals delineating neighborhoods
with threatening military-type imagery with images that convey a more accessible
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identity, such as football players or figures from Celtic mythology (Maddison 246). In
one neighborhood, a painting of an armed partisan over the words ‘YOU ARE NOW
ENTERING LOYALIST SANDY ROW HEARTLAND OF SOUTH BELFAST
ULSTER FREEDOM FIGHTERS’, was covered up by a painting of King William III,
the Prince of Orange (Maddison 246, original emphasis). The new image “still clearly
marked the area as staunchly Protestant and loyalist, but the image itself was far less
threatening” (246).

d. Apology and Forgiveness as Process
“Apologies are not simply an act but a process focused on the possibility of a
future relationship” (Verdeja, as qtd. in Maddison 226). The symbolic power of acts of
contrition and forgiveness, juxtaposing perpetrator and victim, can reverberate through a
society, creating the possibility of reconciliation and shoring up a newly-adopted national
narrative regarding officially-sanctioned atrocities (227-8). But how are apologies to be
secured, and forgiveness to be given? After taking the newly-established narrative and
numerous context-specific variables into account, the designers of the process must
consider what is achievable as well as specifics such as who apologizes, who officiates,
and who forgives. Since the violence was officially sanctioned, the perpetrators in most
cases will not have been held accountable through criminal justice processes. The
underlying conflict will have persisted as structural violence and oppression of victims
even after the cessation of overt violence. If the perpetrators are willing to take
responsibility and apologize completely for the wrongs they have committed, are victims
expected to forgive them immediately and without reservation? The complexity of
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securing both apology and forgiveness in the face of ongoing oppression and impunity
quickly becomes obvious.
Where achievable, apology and forgiveness are the desired next step after truth
processes have successfully revised the official narrative of government-sanctioned
atrocities. “Central to the relational tasks of reconciliation efforts are the projects
designed to draw former enemies into relationship with one another through apology,
forgiveness and individual and societal healing” (Maddison 225). Apologies are a deeply
symbolic way to express responsibility and remorse (225). The same official actors who
directly (or through predecessors) approved or ignored the killings are in a position to
offer some means of making amends to victims. Removing barriers to opportunity,
returning stolen property, and payment of reparations come to mind. Where apologies are
not accompanied by “‘direct and immediate actions’” or another sort of “‘practical
component,’” such as compensation, “they may amount to little more than a ‘hollow
symbolic statement’ that does little to transform the status of victims and survivors”
(Minow, as qtd. in Maddison 227).
In a truth and reconciliation context, an apology is not only a statement, but also
an action (Onus, qtd. in Maddison 227). “It’s not enough to just say sorry. You’ve got to
then take steps and follow it through” (227). Apologies serve to open “political space” in
which “citizens may reflect on more critical views of their troubled histories” (226). This
is especially evident in the case of apologies issued by political elites. The actions that
result from these apologies have a particular importance as a response to countering
entrenched social issues (225). Elite apologies can be a first step to instilling greater
political stability (Verdeja, as qtd. in Maddison 225-6). The action they suggest is that
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“critical reinterpretations of history” are necessary, that victims are morally valuable and
politically recognized, and that the public has the power to imagine new possibilities of
relation between the state and society (225-6).
As to the question of how forgiveness is to be extracted from fantastically
aggrieved victims, many suffering ongoing systemic abuse, Desmond Tutu cautions that
people who have been victimized need not condone what has been done to them or to
their family members, friends, or community. Once the wrong is taken seriously, that can
“[draw] out the sting in the memory that threatens to poison our entire existence” (Tutu,
as qtd. in Maddison 227). Forgiveness can justifiably be positioned as an expression and
acts performed for the sake of victims themselves as well as for perpetrators and the
culture as a whole. Forgiveness is a part of the healing process for survivors as well as for
the larger community. “‘[T]he healing of memories allows traumatized people to connect
at ‘the deepest human level’, which [...] is important for national reconciliation”
(Lapsley, qtd. in Maddison 229). While perfect apologies and unstinting forgiveness may
prove elusive, they are still foundational elements of the process. However, in the
absence of conflict transformation that results in what may reasonably be called
reconciliation, the transference of the conflict into the political sphere will do. “[H]ealing
processes can be understood as an attempt to negotiate the public emotional life of a
divided society, placing anger and fear in context and drawing on other emotions, such as
empathy and compassion, in the hope of establishing a more respectful relationship
across difference and division” (230).

e. Reconciliation as Process
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Recovering systematically repressed facts about the violent insult to the
community, followed by apology and forgiveness to the extent those are achievable,
opens a door to reconciliation (Maddison 48). Again, reconciliation here is not to be
understood as a resolution of, and end to, conflict. Instead, reconciliation processes
address “the political challenges involved in finding ways for people in deeply divided
societies to live together democratically and non-violently, with radical differences” (
Ramsbotham et al., as qtd. in Maddison 45, original emphasis).
The term “reconciliation” is complicated and adaptable. Hamber and Kelly, for
example, see reconciliation as composed of five elements: “the development of a shared
vision of an interdependent and fair society; a means of acknowledging and dealing with
the past; the building of positive relationships; significant cultural and attitudinal change;
and substantial social, economic, and political change” (Hamber and Kelly, as qtd. in
Maddison 49-50). What is reconciled in a reconciliation process is not the conflict within
a deeply divided society, but past and present, the needs of the entire community and the
needs of victims:
Reconciliation seeks to anticipate the future while acknowledging and
memorializing the past; it seeks to be politically inclusive while focusing
on the needs and rights of victims (du Toit 2009: 256); it is both discursive
and normative (Renner 2012: 55); and ‘at once political, legal, cultural,
moral, psychological, and spiritual’ (Kiss 2000: 80); it incorporates
‘psychological, structural and political elements’ (Wale 2013: 8); it is
concerned with both institutional transformation and the restoration of
trust (Mack 2011: 450-1); and it operates at multiple levels, including the
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personal and the political (Quinn 2009: 4). Reconciliation is emphatically
not a process of conflict resolution of the kind that delegitimizes or
represses important forms of political resistance and struggle (Schirch, as
qtd. in Maddison 50-1).
“Despite its complexities,” there is great value in preserving “the rhetorical
power” of the concept of reconciliation, while simultaneously expanding its use to
incorporate “aspects of transition, peacebuilding and transformation” (Maddison 40).
Reconciliation plays a crucial role in “constituting a space for democratic politics out of a
condition of violence” (Muldoon, as qtd. in Maddison 40). Reconciliation enables the
development of a sustainable democracy and nonviolent conflict management strategies
(40). Key to creating such a democracy is the regular and active participation of civil
society in all efforts of reconciliation (Ciociari and Ramji-Nogales 199).
Charles Villa-Vicencio recognizes reconciliation not only as a goal, but as a
process. Reconciliation necessarily requires finding ways to bring people together over
what are often “‘historical and entrenched barriers of suspicion, prejudice and
inequality’” (Villa-Vicencio, as qtd. in Maddison 46). The task of shifting values, of
instilling a “‘willingness to venture beyond the promotion of rigid identities’” (46) and
cultivating energy to imagine and pursue “‘a different set of relations with one’s
adversaries and enemies’” (46) is no brief or straightforward venture. This is a goal that
requires patience, and the understanding that steps taken today may not immediately lead
to visible outcomes or changes, but that they lead towards the creation of a foundation
upon which future generations will build.
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In summary, then, truth and reconciliation processes are conceived as a means of
transforming conflict in ways that bring it into nonviolent social and political arenas and
modes of being (Muldoon, as qtd. in Maddison 53). We may think of conflict
transformation as the broad objective. Under that umbrella are “truth” processes
(dialogue, memory retrieval and memorialization) and “reconciliation” processes
(forgiveness and apology, reconciliation). While the truth processes must begin before
the reconciliation processes, they need not be completed before the reconciliation
processes can begin. Since each of these elements is a process, each is ongoing, just as
the process of conflict transformation to which they contribute is ongoing. Together,
these processes accomplish the foregrounding of repressed information (53). They
politicize the conflict that led to the violent breach in the social fabric by accommodating
it in political discourse and practices. A successful truth and reconciliation process is the
means by which a nonfactual national narrative is successfully challenged and replaced
by a factual counter-narrative. Such a process can empower citizens to create a stable and
healthy democracy.

f. The Problem of Impunity
Conceiving and implementing truth and reconciliation processes is particularly
challenging in circumstances that have been characterized by impunity for a prolonged
period of time. The first set of challenges arises from the passage of time since the
original conflict. The argument may be made that truth and reconciliation become
meaningless when most of the perpetrators and most of the victims have died due to the
passage of time. Who remains to be held accountable, and who to be recognized as
victims? The answer is that profound, extensive, officially sanctioned violence within a
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nation creates intergenerational scripts which continue to compromise the health of
society long after the actual perpetrators and victims have died (Maddison 69). The
“complex emotional burdens” of violence on families and communities are lasting (69).
Trauma, and the accompanying “memories of historical violence,” can be transmitted
intergenerationally, “influencing present and future perceptions of the other community”
and fueling “volatile” political environments that are found in divided societies (Staub
and Pearlman; Hutchison and Bleiker, as qtd. in Maddison 69). Guilt and a sense of
responsibility may also be handed down from one generation to the next (Barkan;
Maddison, as qtd. in Maddison 69). Further, as discussed above, unmanaged conflict is
not exhausted by a singular explosive expression, but continues to manifest itself,
sometimes in periodic direct violence, but almost always in structural and cultural
violence expressed as injustice, exclusion, inequality, prejudice, ignorance, and
discrimination (Ramsbotham, as qtd. in Maddison 26).
Susan Opotow examines the difficulty of reconciliation in post-conflict situations
when crimes against humanity (such as mass murder) are either explicitly or implicitly
excused, or when it becomes expedient to “look the other way,” and impunity is
institutionalized (Opotow 150). Institutionalized impunity creates a culture of impunity in
which abuses go unpunished and justice is absent (150). Opotow identifies three
interrelated facets of impunity—structural impunity (relating to “institutional structures
of the state, such as constitutional authority conferred on the army for internal security”),
strategic impunity (that is, “specific procedures and structures adopted to prevent
criminal investigation or prosecution”), and political/psychological impunity (the
“manipulation of fear, distrust, and isolation among citizens,” the “most poignant and
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tragic of all aspects of impunity”) (151). She discusses the relationship between violence
and impunity, citing Johann Galtung’s distinction between direct and structural violence
(151). Direct violence is understood as violence that is explicit, overt, and committed by
specific people upon specific victims (151). Structural violence is imperceptible, upheld
in societal structures as “the way things are done,” and manifests as inequalities
structured into society (such as access to social goods and services that promote wellbeing only for some members of society) (151). In cultures of impunity, these forms of
violence are indistinguishable (152).
Impunity is dependent on a set of relationships that guard and uphold it, lending
social support to institutional bodies and actors that should otherwise be punished for
perpetrating crimes against humanity (Opotow 153). These relationships, called
collusion, depend on cooperation and mutual protection of shared interests (that is, not
being punished) in groups of perpetrators of direct violence, as well as requiring the
support of larger networks (154). Police officers, for example, might participate in
corrupt or violent behavior. They depend on other institutions, such as the court system,
to “protect them from accountability” (154) and to maintain the status quo from which
they benefit. This builds a moral framework in which violence towards some people is
acceptable and appropriate (155). This “moral exclusion” (155) rationalizes harm
inflicted on those perceived to be beyond the scope of justice (156), dehumanizing
victims and members of less dominant groups while bolstering dominant group members’
perceptions of their own dignity, humanity, and worthiness for access to resources and
protections of the state (156).
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Institutionalized, longstanding impunity becomes a politically expedient strategy.
It has serious impacts on how different groups view one another and their willingness to
work with one another, creating difficulty in rallying the necessary institutional bodies to
participate or encourage or allow TRCs to begin taking shape (Opotow 160). Members of
dominant or “in-groups” (156) are coming from a place where non-dominant (or “outgroup”) members are viewed as so irrelevant that they do not have the same claims to
fairness, justice, or resources (156). If impunity is longstanding, in-group members may
have come to minimize and lose their grasp of the severity of their crimes (157). Violence
is glorified and supported by institutions and individuals. Summoning the will to feel
prepared to potentially face the loss of these protections and benefits is immense and
complicated. While to some extent TRCs take place at the level of individuals, it is also
key to their success that they be met with institutional support and guidance, so that longterm goals and changes can be addressed (Maddison 268). Parties that have emerged
victorious from conflicts can thwart attempts to prosecute violators of human rights
(Opotow 160). They may negotiate amnesties and pardons as preconditions for peace
talks, thereby negating the possibility for justice (160).
For out-group members, this culture of moral exclusion and impunity is a source
of pain, anxiety, and grief. For many survivors of Pol Pot’s regime in Cambodia, for
example, Khmer Rouge impunity is a “source of continuing anguish” and an “obstacle to
personal healing” (Ciorciari and Ramji-Nogales 198). Reconciliation efforts thus face
extensive challenges in “cultivating a new attitude towards others” as the basis for
addressing “the major material and structural challenges” that perpetuate war and
violence in post-conflict societies (Villa-Vicencio, as qtd. in Maddison 46). The success
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of the process hinges on changing the perception of some members of society as beyond
the reach of justice, and of instilling the urgency for remorse in a system that minimizes
these experiences by supporting perpetrators of violence (Opotow 156).

g. Discourse Analysis in Understanding Truth and Reconciliation Processes
Discursive strategy analysis and construction is at the heart of truth and
reconciliation. The fundamental task of truth and reconciliation processes is to identify
and call into question the accuracy of dominant national narratives which deny, obscure,
or falsify governmentally-sanctioned episodes of violence on a massive scale. The
identification of these narratives depends on the close reading of cultural texts, including
publications, films, and other public and private discourse. Truth and reconciliation
processes can be seen as attempts to constitute opposing narratives to challenge and
correct a nonfactual dominant narrative. The discursive choices constituting both
dominant and challenger narratives are highly strategic.
Maddison touches on the rhetorical dimension of truth and reconciliation in her
analysis of how the continuity of conflict post-catastrophe can be either hidden or clearly
identified. The ways post-conflict violence is discursively portrayed should have a role in
how reconciliation and conflict transformation efforts are imagined and structured
(Maddison 33). Violence is spoken of in different terms when it is thought of as being
officially over, although there are certainly still “continuities of violence” between the
war and postwar intervals (Schuld, as qtd. in Maddison 33). Similarly, narratives have a
role in curtailing violence by bringing conflict into the political arena (Muldoon, as qtd.
in Maddison 53). This happens “not because there is sudden agreement about past
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wrongs, but because marginalized groups politicize those past actions by renaming them
as injustices” (53).
Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak have designed a Discourse-Historical Approach
(DHA) to critical discourse analysis. Their approach is adaptable for use in a truth and
reconciliation context. The questions they devise in examining discursive strategies are
useful in the close reading of pertinent cultural texts.
1.

How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and
actions named and referred to linguistically?

2.

What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social
actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes?

3.

What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?

4.

From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and
arguments expressed?

5.

Are the respective utterances articulated overtly; are they
intensified or mitigated?
(Reisigl and Wodak 93)

The answers to these questions illuminate the speaker’s discursive strategy as to
the five dimensions identified by Reisigl and Wodak. All five dimensions will be present
in every discourse. The first, nomination, is the discursive construction of actors and
events. The second, predication, is the positive or negative qualification of actors and
events. The third, argumentation, either justifies or questions truth and rightness claims.
The fourth, perspectivization, positions the speaker’s point of view, showing either
involvement or distance. The last, intensification and mitigation, modifies the force of
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assertions made, one way or the other (Wodak and Meyer 93). In the context of discourse
about officially-sanctioned killing of civilians on a mass scale, calibrating a speaker’s
discursive strategy enables the analyst to assess the relative strengths and vulnerabilities
of the dominant national narrative as well as of competing narratives. This analysis is
ground zero in accurately understanding the contours and progress of truth and
reconciliation processes.

2. Primary Source Materials
Until the release of The Act of Killing, the events of 1965 were relatively
unknown both within Indonesia and to the international community. Oppenheimer’s two
films have provided an important precursor to the possibility of conceiving and executing
an official truth and reconciliation process. The films and other primary source materials
reveal the contours that a process in Indonesia might take by disclosing the dominant
narrative, challenger narratives, and current discourses in Indonesia about these
completing narratives. Taken together, Oppenheimer’s films provide a truly extraordinary
range of perspectives, from articulations of the dominant national narrative to fledgling
counter-narratives.
As primary texts, The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence are amenable to deep
analysis using the discourse-historical approach to discourse analysis designed by Reisigl
and Wodak as a means to examine how the perpetrators and the victims discursively
construct narratives that either support or counter the dominant national narrative of the
killings. The films are also susceptible to examination according to theoretical and
conceptual frameworks advanced in secondary source materials by Ciorciari and RamjiNogales, Maddison, Opotow, and others. This serves as a way to explore how different
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processes integral to reconciliation are or are not taking shape, what obstacles they may
face, and what considerations are appropriate in terms of larger scale reconciliation in
Indonesia’s context of institutionalized impunity. Other primary source materials are used
as counterpoints and substantiating documents, including reports and transcripts issued
by the 1965 People’s Tribunal in the Hague and articles in contemporary periodical
literature.
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V.

Methodology
My approach to this inquiry is to draw on my background in the field of English

to conduct critical discourse analyses of Joshua Oppenheimer’s films. The study of
English as a discipline involves the central tasks of creating, identifying, analyzing,
challenging, and revising texts and narratives. Essential to these tasks are considerations
of discursive strategy and of how narratives function in a culture. Treating
Oppenheimer’s documentaries as texts, I identify and analyze the dominant narrative, as
well as counter-narratives, about the events of 1965 in Indonesia. My main interest is in
how the already-existing dominant narrative is discursively reconstructed and reinforced
(and how that impacts people’s understanding of these events) as well as how counternarratives are taking shape to displace the narrative justifying the state-sponsored
slaughter of civilians. This narrative revision is an indispensable step toward a
reconciliation process.
Critical discourse analysis is “characterized by the common interest in demystifying ideologies and power through the systematic and retroductable investigation
of semiotic data (written, spoken or visual)” (Wodak and Meyer 3, original emphasis).
Discourse is seen as a form of “social practice,” in that it is indicative of dialectical
relationships between “a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and
social structure(s), which frame it” (Fairclough and Wodak, as qtd. in Wodak and Meyer
5). Discourse is both “socially constitutive” and “socially conditioned”— “it constitutes
situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between
people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and
reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it” (6).
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Critical discourse analysis is an analytical method well suited to an inquiry into how a
fictitious and unjust social narrative is upheld, and how it might be subverted.
My inquiry into truth and reconciliation processes, and the shape they might take
in Indonesia, is structured around an adapted version of the discourse historical approach
(DHA) to critical discourse analysis laid out by Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak. The
DHA is centered on trying to create “a theory of discourse by linking fields of action
(Girnth, 1996), genres, discourses and texts” (Wodak and Meyer 26). The DHA follows
Mouzelis’ recommendations for social research, namely to “develop conceptual tools
adequate for specific social problems,” focusing in particular on the field of politics,
where it “develops conceptual frameworks for political discourse” (26). I have
condensed Wodak and Reisigl’s original outline for the DHA to better suit the scale of
this particular project. They propose an 8-step model, which I have modified to a 5-step
model by combining some steps and omitting others. I use Reisigl and Wodak’s
methodology to examine how the events of 1965 are discursively constructed in
Oppenheimer’s documentaries and various contextual documents. These findings are
assembled in tables located in Appendices B and C. The adapted steps from Reisigl and
Wodak’s approach are listed below.1
After analyzing primary source materials with this method, I then apply concepts
discussed above from secondary source materials to Oppenheimer’s films, examining the
roles of dialogue, impunity, memory and memorialization, and reconciliation in conflict
transformation in the Indonesian context. What aspects of these major processes do the
primary source materials exhibit? How are they discursively constructed? What might
that indicate overall regarding the presence of preconditions for conflict transformation
1

See original proposal in Appendix A
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and reconciliation in Indonesia? I draw conclusions from the analysis using these
theoretical structures. I also utilize pieces of mainstream Indonesian journalism and other
reports and proceedings relating to the events of 1965-66 to contextualize Oppenheimer’s
films in public discourse. Finally, I assess where things currently stand in Indonesia in
terms of readiness to take on a reconciliation process, and imagine how this process
might proceed.
The steps in the adapted discourse-historical approach to critical discourse
analysis are as follows:
1. Activate and consult preceding theoretical knowledge (i.e. recollection, reading,
and discussion of previous research). Specifically, research about the purpose,
methodology, and application of truth and reconciliation processes.
2. Systematic collection of data, context information (various discourses and
discursive events, social fields as well as actors, semiotic media), and primary
source materials.
3. Evaluation of primary source materials using discourse analysis strategies
outlined in Wodak and Reisigl’s chapter on the Discourse Historical Approach.
Identify and analyze discursive strategies which shape the dominant and insurgent
narratives concerning 1965. Discursive strategies are as follows:
I.

Nomination—the discursive construction of actors and events. How are
persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes, and actions named and
referred to linguistically?
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II.

Predication—The positive or negative qualification of actors and events.
What characteristics, qualities, and features are attributed to social actors,
objects, phenomena/events and processes?

III.

Argumentation—The justification of truth and rightness claims. What
arguments are employed in the discourse in question?

IV.

Perspectivization—Positioning of the speaker’s point of view, showing
either involvement or distance. From what perspective are these
nominations, attributions, and arguments expressed?

V.

Intensification and Mitigation—Modification of force of assertions made.
Are the respective utterances articulated overtly; are they intensified or
mitigated?
(Reisigl and Wodak 93).

4. Draw conclusions from the analysis.
5. Assess where Indonesia stands on the road to reconciliation. Imagine how
Indonesia might proceed in taking steps toward a reconciliation process.
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VI.

Analysis
The dominant narrative of the massacres was constructed and reinforced over the

span of Suharto’s rule. Suharto launched a propaganda campaign that “provided the
trigger for the mass killings of 1965-66” (McGregor). Following the crushing of the
September 30th Movement, the army worked to “shut down Communist and other leftist
publications,” and pro-army newspapers began to dominate the media (McGregor). These
newspapers “set about spreading grisly accounts of the murders of the army leaders,
claiming their bodies had been mutilated prior to and after their deaths” (McGregor). The
retaliatory killings of civilians were subsequently minimized and misrepresented in
school textbooks, further supporting the formation of the dominant narrative (McGregor).
Within weeks of the failed coup, the military had produced a book emphasizing the PKI’s
responsibility and “their alleged depravity during the kidnapping and killing of the seven
army martyrs” (McGregor). A propaganda film reenactment of the killings was shown
repeatedly on all television stations (McGregor). The regime designated October 1st as
“Sacred Pancasila Day”—a commemoration of the day the national ideological principles
had been saved from a communist plot (McGregor). After the fall of Suharto in 1998, a
few brave people inside and outside of the government started challenging the dominant
narrative, although their efforts were consistently met with obstruction, threats, and actual
violence (McGregor).
In 2012, two events brought simmering fears and anger regarding the 1965
massacres in Indonesia to the forefront of public consciousness. One was the release of a
report by Indonesia’s National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM) on the
results of its investigation into human rights violations in 1965. The second was the
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release of documentarian Joshua Oppenheimer’s film The Act of Killing. Two years later,
in 2014, Oppenheimer released a companion film, The Look of Silence, also dealing with
the events of 1965. In November 2015, an International People’s Tribunal convened in
the Hague and took four days of testimony concerning those same events. Each of these
seminal texts has been reported and discussed in the popular press. Oppenheimer’s
provocative films, in which perpetrators of government-sanctioned mass murder frankly
discuss their crimes, have become the focal point of both national and international
conversations about whether and how Indonesia’s government might institute a truth and
reconciliation process.

1. Joshua Oppenheimer’s The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence
The Act of Killing and its companion film, The Look of Silence, focus on the
prolific yet little known Indonesian massacres of ethnic Chinese, suspected communists,
alleged enemies of the state, and others in 1965-66. Though quite different in approach,
with the first providing a platform primarily for the perpetrators, the second for the
victims, the films together document the continuing damage resulting from the lack of
accountability and of a government-sponsored process for truth and reconciliation.
Oppenheimer discovers that the perpetrators, though triumphant, live in fear. They fear
the surviving family members of the murdered and the possibility of a correction to the
national narrative glorifying their brutality. The victims live in despair and in fear of
suffering the same fate as their family members. The combined effects of structural,
strategic, and political impunity deepen the chasm between victims and perpetrators.
Oppenheimer’s films horrifyingly document the resulting deep, pervasive unease on both
sides. The current situation in Indonesia demonstrates Maddison’s hypothesis that
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conflict is not resolved with the end of open hostilities. Instead, it goes underground,
flaring up from time to time.

2

The films document the dominant cultural narrative concerning the events of 1965
through the voices of the killers and their government collaborators, as well as the way
insurgent narratives bump up against the dominant narrative through the voices of
victims. The filmmaker constitutes his own independent discourse, which is also highly
relevant to the question of what form truth and reconciliation processes might take.

a. Discourse analysis of The Act of Killing
The Act of Killing is a discursively complex and intriguing text. It is structured not
just around Oppenheimer’s interviews and interactions with former killers, but also
around the killers’ own reenactments of their involvement as gangsters and death squad
leaders in north Sumatra in 1965. The reenactments are woven through Oppenheimer’s
documentary to shape a portrait of one side’s experience of these events. The killers’
retellings of the murders are elaborately staged on the set of their own film, where they
control and construct how past events should look, should be acted, and should be
directed. Their taste for the cinematic is stunning. These scenes are set between
interviews—sometimes in groups, sometimes in one-on-one discussions with
Oppenheimer—where the perpetrators reflect on what happened in 1965, what the
consequences have been, and what they think now about those events. The official
narrative is continuously constructed throughout the film including in interviews with
2

The conflict Oppenheimer documents is still active and dangerous, despite the passage of 50
years since the original violence took place. When government action causes a breach in the
social fabric which creates a deeply-divided society, only a government-sponsored truth and
reconciliation process effecting conflict transformation can render the conflict “safe.”
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public figures such as Ibrahim Sinik, a famous newspaper publisher in Medan; in Anwar
Congo and Herman Koto’s appearance on a local news channel; and in Vice President
Jusuf Kalla’s address to a paramilitary rally. Sometimes worried about sounding too
harsh, these figures will turn to the camera and assure their invisible audience, and the
film crew, that they aren’t really that violent normally, that this was an extraordinary
situation that called for extraordinary action (Killing).
One of the most startling constructions of the national narrative is Vice President
Jusuf Kalla’s. He addresses Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth—the massive youth
paramilitary organization of which many of the killers are high-ranking founders and
esteemed members), exhibiting the five discursive characteristics identified by Wodak
and Reisigl. In his nominative and predicative discursive choices, Kalla constructs the
killers as courageous national heroes and their crimes against civilians as the salvation of
Indonesia’s democracy. Kalla praises the preman (Indonesian for “gangster”, derived
from the English “free-man”) spirit of Pemuda Pancasila (Killing). The nation, Kalla
says, “needs free men! If everyone worked for the government, we’d be a nation of
bureaucrats; we’d get nothing done! We need free men to get things done” (Killing). The
“things” Kalla is referring to are the killings of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians.
Kalla’s argumentation elaborates a narrative in which heroic citizens did what had to be
done when government alone could not act. He perspectivizes himself as an involved
admirer of civilian heroes rather than distancing himself from their deeds. Kalla
intensifies his narrative by engaging in this brazen celebration of mass executions of
civilians in an open-air venue with thousands of paramilitary affiliates in attendance. This
public embrace by a senior government official further intensifies the rightness claims of
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the official narrative because it is a promise of perpetual collusive relationships and
unconstrained impunity for the killers.
At the beginning of The Act of Killing, Anwar Congo, a former gangster and death
squad leader, shows Oppenheimer a rooftop where he killed thousands of men. In
Anwar’s discursive choices in repeating the national narrative, he constructs himself and
the other killers as brave heroes and their victims as weak and unworthy. Anwar proudly
demonstrates his preferred way of killing—strangling the victim with a wire—for
Oppenheimer. Anwar’s argumentation justifies the truth and rightness claims of the
dominant narrative. In his perspectivization of the slaughter, Anwar posits himself as
fully involved. However, Anwar (self-servingly?) mitigates the force of his assertions by
telling Oppenheimer that he drinks and takes drugs and goes out dancing to forget what
he’s done (Killing). “I’ve tried to forget all this with good music” he says. “Dancing [...]
A little alcohol, a little marijuana… A little… what do you call it? Ecstasy… Once I’d
get drunk, I’d ‘fly’ and feel happy” (Killing). He then flippantly proceeds to perform his
cha-cha-cha. Anwar further mitigates his rightness claims by talking about nightmares he
has about the murders. He tells his friends that he knows these dreams “come from what I
did… killing people who didn’t want to die. I forced them to die” (Killing). By mitigating
the force of the national narrative, Anwar opens the door to a challenger narrative in
which the violence is condemned.
In a particularly jarring scene from the killers’ reconstruction of the murders,
Anwar plays the part of a communist being interrogated. He stops the scene, short of
breath, and says he can’t go on. Oppenheimer plays the scene back to him. Anwar
recalibrates the perspectivization of his discourse, distancing himself from the scene, in
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this way further mitigating the force of his justification of official claims of rightness.
Anwar asks if his feelings when playing the part of a communist suspect—paralyzing
fear and hopelessness—were what the people he killed had felt (Killing). Oppenheimer
speaks to him from behind the camera, saying that Anwar’s victims felt much, much
worse, because Anwar knew it was only a reenactment, whereas his victims knew they
were actually going to be killed (Killing). At the end of the film Anwar and Oppenheimer
return to the rooftop where earlier Anwar danced, but by this point, after making his own
movie reenacting his crimes, Anwar is unable to continue boasting about the murders. He
begins to retch violently.
Oppenheimer’s exploration of the inward price the killers have paid for their
outward impunity is complemented by his examination of the suffering of surviving
family members. Whereas the killers live in fear of accountability, yet suffer from the
lack of it, the victims live with the rage, hatred, bitterness, grief, and despair of justice
denied as well as with the terror of suffering the same fate as their murdered family
members at the hands of killers who are still prominent citizens in their communities. The
victims, both present and absent, tell the insurgent narrative about 1965. Absent victims
speak through the killers, who gleefully report how the victims tried to flee, wept, and
begged for mercy. In these accounts of the last words of the dead, we hear their
predication of themselves as innocent victims, of the killers as savages, and of the
massacres as a wanton campaign of terror. The counter-narrative that arises from these
reported statements powerfully undermines the dominant narrative.
A counter-narrative also emerges from within the confines of an articulation of
the dominant narrative by an actor in the killers’ film. In one scene, an ethnic Chinese
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Indonesian cast member volunteers a story to be added to the project. By means of
complexly dualistic discursive choices, the ethnic Chinese man constructs the episode of
his stepfather’s execution as humorous and appropriate. He predicates his stepfather as
despicable and deserving of an ignominious death, the assassins as powerful and justified.
He does not question the rightness claims of the killers. Yet his perspectivization of
himself as intimately allied, not with the killers, but with his stepfather, as well as his
exceedingly emotional intensification of the force of his assertions, combine to
completely undermine his discursive strategy and reveal a non-strategic hidden discourse
in which his stepfather is nominated and predicated as a hapless victim to be pitied; the
killers are nominated and predicated as ruthless villains; and the rightness claim of the
dominant narrative is challenged.
The ethnic Chinese man recounts his stepfather’s execution as follows. Killers
came to their home in the middle of the night and dragged his stepfather away, ignoring
his mother’s pleas for mercy. The next morning he discovered the body, hidden under an
oil drum in the road. The man assures Anwar and the others that he doesn’t mean to
offend them. He tells them how funny his stepfather’s death was, how hilarious the body
looked in the oil drum. However, he begins to weep uncontrollably. The killers tell him
that his story is too complicated, that they can’t use every story (Killing). They continue
shooting a scene, with the ethnic Chinese man playing the part of a suspect being
interrogated. Crying and spitting, he is unable to regain his composure. He has snot all
over his face as he speaks both in character, and as the child who lost his father, begging
for mercy. This man’s unintentional undermining of the dominant narrative through his
obviously unscripted experience of inhabiting his stepfather’s experience shows the
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dominant narrative to be a grotesque fabrication. For victims, adopting the dominant
narrative is only possible through excruciating self-abasement.
The victims speak again in two other scenes from the film within a film, one the
massacres at Kampung Kolam, a village of women and children; and the other a
production number at the end of the film. The village scene, like the interrogation scene,
directly juxtaposes the dominant and insurgent narratives through competing discourses.
The women and children, who are untrained actors in the killers’ movie, construct and
predicate their characters as innocent victims of terror and their killers as brutal monsters.
During a break in the filming, one of the killers actually reinforces the victims’ discourse
by bragging about the sexual mutilation of women murdered in 1965 (Killing). He does
not offer condemnatory argumentation, perspectivize himself remotely, or mitigate the
force of his discourse. He doesn’t need to, because he is well within the parameters of the
sanctioned national narrative. This huge area of overlap in the national and challenger
narratives (the horrifying numbers of the dead, the details of the killings), which the
killers do not deny, but boast of, presents the greatest hope for the ultimate reconceiving
of the national narrative and transformation of the cultural conflict.
In a subtext to the stories of the killers and of the victims, Josh Oppenheimer
himself advances a narrative in The Act of Killing. Dispensing with the illusion that
documentaries are neutral factual statements that make themselves, Oppenheimer is
actually present in the film and converses with the perpetrators at times. At other times,
though he does not speak, the audience understands that the perpetrators are responding
to him. Oppenheimer discursively nominates the people killed in 1965 and predicates
them with compassion as innocent victims. Oppenheimer’s construction and qualification
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of the perpetrators is more complex. In pointing out to Anwar on the set of the killers’
film that his unease cannot be equated with the pure terror of innocent people who knew
they were about to be murdered, Oppenheimer qualifies the perpetrators as morally and
emotionally detached from their own actions. The viewer gathers, in listening to Adi
Zulkadry’s defiance of a possible international war crimes tribunal, that Oppenheimer’s
attitude toward the massacres has been condemnatory (Killing). Nevertheless, in listening
to the ruminations of the perpetrators and in filming their reenactments, Oppenheimer
accords human dignity to the killers as well as to the murdered. While his argumentation
clearly questions the rightness claims of the killers, his perspectivization positions him
close, engaging them intimately, not remotely. Similarly, the force of Oppenheimer’s
condemnation of the massacres is mitigated by his compassion for the killers.
In the production number created by the killers for the end of their movie,
Anwar’s victims approach him on an elaborate set complete with a chaste chorus line of
dancers in costumes invoking the flag of Indonesian democracy. The victims drape a
medal over Anwar’s neck and thank him for killing them and sending them to heaven
(Killing). Again, the dominant narrative is shown to consist of discourse constructing the
killers as saviors of the nation. In reliance on the seeming immutability of the narrative,
Anwar does not perspectivize himself remotely. He maximally intensifies the force of his
assertions. However, the great weakness in the dominant narrative is obvious from the
fact that it relies on Anwar’s predication of the dead as understanding that they fully
deserved the death he meted out and are thankful to him for doing so (Killing). Again,
the weakness of the national narrative is that the facts are not in dispute. A mere
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discursive pivot, from justifying rightness claims to questioning them, unravels the thread
of the story.

b. Discourse analysis of The Look of Silence
The Look of Silence unfolds as the story of a man seeking honesty from the men
in his community who murdered his brother Ramli in 1965. Adi Rukun, an optometrist,
uses his profession as a means to engage former killers in conversation, testing their eyes
while probing them about their involvement in the Snake River massacres in northern
Sumatra. The film is punctuated with footage Oppenheimer shows to Adi from earlier
interviews with local perpetrators. In the course of the film, details of Ramli’s gruesome
and horrifyingly brutal murder are slowly revealed. The complex narrative that ensues is
one which focuses on victims constructing a counter-narrative about the civilian
massacres of 1965. As Oppenheimer and Adi confront them, the perpetrators also speak
and reconstruct the dominant narrative. The insurgent narrative meets firm opposition
from the killers, but a more nuanced response from the killers’ families.
The killers nominate the events of 1965, and the roles they played, predicating the
violence as just and correct. In their argumentation, the killers uphold and discursively
reconstitute the dominant narrative through such statements as that made by Amir
Siahaan, who, when describing the murders, says that the killers should be rewarded with
a cruise to America since they played a role in a matter of international politics. Siahaan’s
argumentation fully adopts official claims of rightness. He predicates his participation in
a death squad as revolutionary and essential to the formation of democracy. Adi’s son is
shown learning about the killings in school. His teacher predicates the communists as
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ruthless and cruel, and instructs the children to thank men like Amir Siahaan for their
“heroic struggle” to fight communism and establish a democracy (Silence).
Siahaan’s predication is echoed in an NBC News report Oppenheimer shows Adi.
The report features an American reporter, whose argumentation celebrates the massacres
of 1965 as “the single biggest defeat ever handed to communists anywhere in the world”
(Silence). He predicates the victims as subhuman by talking about entire families being
“liquidated” in a “purge” lasting for sixteen months (Silence). In a bizarre
misappropriation, the alleged voices of victims are used to construct the dominant
narrative in an interview with a Balinese villager, who tells the American reporter (Ted
Yates) that communists in the area “realized that they were wrong” and came to village
leaders asking to be killed (Silence). The perpetrator perspectivizes himself so intimately
and unapologetically with the dominant narrative that he has the effrontery to violate the
dead in using them to support official rightness claims.
Two killers who feature prominently in the film are Amir Hasan and Inong. They
appear both in the early footage Oppenheimer shows Adi, and later in face-to-face
interviews Adi orchestrates. In one segment, Amir Hasan and Inong take Oppenheimer to
the banks of the Snake River, where they discursively nominate the massacre, the
victims, and their own roles in the killings. They predicate the slaughter as “historic,” an
episode within a political revolution (Silence). They specifically recall the brutal murder
of Ramli on the riverbank. Each helps the other remember details of Ramli’s execution.
Amir goes so far in this unscripted retelling as to tell Oppenheimer where to stand to film
the scene. Inong even brings a knife along to make the reenactment more “authentic”
(Silence). They predicate Ramli as an enemy who had to be killed. Amir remarks, “Ramli
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was probably a good person… But what could we do? It was a revolution” (Silence).
Under the banner of revolution, Amir Hasan and Inong argumentatively justify the
rightness claim of the official narrative. They predicate themselves as agents of the
revolution, perspectivizing themselves close to the killing. Why not? Within the context
of this narrative, the killings were completely legitimate. Nevertheless, a note of unease
comes through in their admission that Ramli was “probably” a good person. This insight
mitigates the force of the killers’ assertions and complicates their predication of
themselves and their victims. The force of their assertions is further mitigated through
Ramli’s voice, which is strangely and hauntingly present as Inong and Amir Hasan mimic
his cries for help before they killed him.
The dominant narrative is discursively reconstructed again in Adi’s interview with
Samsir, another killer. Samsir’s adult daughter is also in attendance for this interview,
and her presence interestingly complicates the narrative that unfolds. Samsir nominates
killers, victims, and incidents and predicates them predictably. He seems intimately
perspectivized as he brags of his heroism in bringing a woman’s head to a market to
intimidate ethnic Chinese Indonesians (Silence). However, Samsir subverts his
argumentative justification by reporting that he had to drink blood from the bodies of the
murdered in order to keep from going crazy. As with the admission by Amir Hasan and
Inong that Ramli was probably a good person, Samsir’s revelation about drinking blood
to ward off madness mitigates the force of his simplistic predications and rightness
claims. Samsir’s daughter is clearly uncomfortable throughout this discussion as she
apparently learns these details for the first time, but she still tries to defend her father. Adi
tells Samsir and his daughter that his brother was killed by a death squad. The daughter
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immediately steps into her father’s discourse to perspectivize herself remotely and
substantially mitigate his rightness claims. She asks Adi to forgive her. Adi tells her it
isn’t her fault that Samsir is a murderer. The daughter offers her own predication of her
killer-father. She asks Adi for his compassion to look on her father as an old man, and to
think about them as family.
Samsir’s daughter’s sentiment—to think of one another as family—is echoed by
Amir Hasan’s wife. Amir Hasan has died in the interim since the interview in which he
and Inong stand on the riverbank reporting the details of how they killed Ramli. In a later
scene, Oppenheimer and Adi interview Amir Hasan’s wife and sons in their home. Like
Samsir’s daughter, Amir Hasan’s wife is uncomfortable with the truth claims of the
dominant narrative and recoils from predicating her husband as a hero for his crimes. She
perspectivizes herself remotely, claiming to have no recollection of her husband ever
saying he was involved in the killings—despite her presence in the earlier interview in
which her husband showed Oppenheimer a book he wrote and illustrated “to bring [his
death squad involvement] to life” (Silence). Oppenheimer has brought the book along.
Amir Hasan’s wife looks disturbed as they go through it, and insists she’s never seen it
before. Oppenheimer reminds her that she was there when her husband showed him the
book and gave him a copy. Her discursive argumentation continues to question not only
the rightness claims of the official narrative, but also the truth claims. “We know nothing
about this. My husband never told us. We never read the book. My husband never said he
killed anyone” (Silence). One of her sons supports this— “we didn’t know what he was
doing… he never told us” (Silence). The family’s discourse, so different from that of the
killers, shows profound discomfort with argumentative assertions of rightness, employing
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distant perspectivization and mitigation of the force of all aspects of the dominant
narrative.
Oppenheimer persists with challenging the authenticity of Amir Hasan’s family’s
attempts at argumentative disputation of the dominant narrative’s truth claims and remote
perspectivization of their killer-father and themselves. He confronts them, “I don’t want
to make you uncomfortable, but Adi is here to speak openly” (Silence). One of Amir
Hasan’s sons responds, “Everyone around here is friends. Even if their parents were
killed, we’re all good friends. Now the wound is open, because Joshua makes this film,
and my father wrote this book—the wound is open” (Silence). He grows menacing as he
asks Adi, “ Otherwise you wouldn’t know me, right?” (Silence). Adi replies, “Of course I
knew. I knew all about this family. All the victims’ families know who the killers are.
But that doesn’t mean we want revenge” (Silence). This extraordinary exchange reveals
the troubling persistence of the conflict, which is no longer overt, but clearly structural in
nature and still dangerously untransformed. It also reveals the openness of families of
death squad members to the challenger narrative. Whereas their husbands and fathers
perspectivize themselves intimately in brazenly bragging of their murderous exploits, the
wives and children are already constructing a discourse that could become a bridge to a
successor narrative. As Adi and Oppenheimer are about to leave her home, having been
threatened by her sons, Amir Hasan’s wife tells Adi : “Adi, we apologize. We feel the
same way you do” (Silence).
The official narrative perpetrators reconstruct in The Look of Silence is
maintained by means of excuses and threats. Each killer can boast about his involvement,
about the ways he most preferred to kill people, when he is talking about victims as a
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faceless, nameless mass. When confronted by Adi, and by the story of his brother Ramli,
they quickly backpedal, adjusting their perspectivization from intimate to remote, trying
to find someone else to predicate as responsible. It was the orders of their commanding
officers; it was something the government told them to do; the squad they were in charge
of was killing people in a different location and didn’t take part in the killings at Snake
River. Although they do maintain their claims to rightness, the killers also seem to inhabit
a delusional world where they thrive off everyone’s fear of them, while simultaneously
believing that nobody knows about the specific roles they had in committing the violence.
The viewer hears several paramilitary death squad members and their families
reconstructing the dominant narrative and variations in The Look of Silence, as they are
confronted by Adi and Oppenheimer. But at the heart of the film are Adi and other
victims constructing a counter-narrative about the events of 1965. Adi predicates his
brother’s killers as murderers, but also as his neighbors. His approach in interviewing
them is not to punish or seek revenge, but to find acknowledgement of the crimes they
committed and to receive their apology. His stance is that if he and they can see one
another’s humanity, they can move forward and live together as neighbors, the rift in the
community thus healed.
Adi interviews Kemat, a man who survived being killed at Snake River by
jumping out of a prisoner transport truck. Kemat tells Adi that the people in town were
too scared to watch the victims be lined up and marched out of town. He remembers how
Ramli screamed for help, saying, “They’re going to kill us all!” (Silence). Adi and Kemat
go to the banks of the Snake River together, retracing Inong and Amir Hasan’s steps. As
they step off the road and onto the killing field, Kemat nominates the victims who died
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there and predicates them as his “friends and family” (Silence). Curiously, Kemat
perspectivizes himself remotely, saying that he knows God will punish the perpetrators in
the afterlife. “It is not for us to punish,” he says (Silence). Kemat maintains that the past
is past. He doesn’t want to remember what happened. “It’s covered up. Why open it
again?” he asks (Silence). “The wound has healed” (Silence). Kemat was intimately
involved in the killings, narrowly escaping with his life. He does not question the truth
and rightness claims of the counter-narrative, but unexpectedly mitigates their force by
questioning the purpose of advancing a narrative in opposition to the official one. Kemat
mitigates his feelings, his involvement, his need for honesty and justice, all out of fear of
the possible consequences of reopening old wounds. Kemat’s underlying fear betrays the
fallacy of his argument that the wounds have healed. Adi, who was not born until two
years after his brother’s death, and is therefore less intimately connected to the events
than Kemat, takes on a more involved role, perspectivizing himself closely and
intensifying the truth and rightness claims of the counter-narrative.
Adi’s mother Rohani, like Kemat, perspectivizes herself distantly. While she
nominates the players and slaughter, predicating the killers as villainous assassins, the
victims as innocents, Rohani cautions Adi against getting too involved (Silence). She
mitigates the intensity of the challenger narrative’s truth and rightness claims by warning
Adi about the danger of reawakening old tensions. Rohani tells her son to take a club or
knife along to his interviews to defend himself in case the killers try to kidnap him. She
prays to Ramli’s spirit to forgive her for letting the killers take him away. Like Kemat,
Rohani tells Adi that the killers, their children, and their grandchildren will all be
punished in the afterlife (Silence). Rohani’s discursive mitigation, like Kemat’s, only
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proves the exact opposite of what she is asserting. If the conflict were really over, she
would have no reason to fear the consequences of a challenge to the dominant narrative.
The telling of the final chapter in Ramli’s story reveals a peculiar discursive
mitigation that poignantly calls the dominant narrative’s rightness claims into question.
Friends and neighbors took Ramli prisoner and beat him, grievously wounding him. He
managed to escape, covering his open abdomen with one hand as he crawled home. He
asked his horrified mother to make him a cup of coffee, but by the time the water had
boiled, his killers were at the door. Rohani recounts begging them to let her take care of
Ramli. She tried bribing them with a cow, but they were adamant. They told her they
were going to take Ramli to the hospital. Rohani tells Adi that she knew this was a lie;
she knew they were going to kill Ramli (Silence). But somehow in that moment, even
though they all knew the truth of what was about to unfold, the killers wouldn’t tell
Rohani explicitly that Ramli was going to be executed for being a communist. They made
up a lie about something more compassionate, perspectivizing themselves remotely from
the condition Ramli was already in because of them as well as from the fate he was about
to meet at their hands. This lie mitigates to the point of denial the force of the killers’
rightness claims. Had the men who came to take the mortally wounded Ramli away been
sure that what they were doing was right, they could have told his mother so. They could
have told themselves so. The fact that they did not reveals a fatal weakness in the
dominant narrative’s rightness claims. The killers were ashamed of what they had done
and what they were planning to keep doing, but they were going to do it anyway, so they
invented a story to make it bearable.
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In The Look of Silence, as in The Act of Killing, the dominant and challenger
narratives don’t diverge at the facts, but at the rightness claims. That is, while the facts
are not widely taught or publicized, everyone who knows anything about 1965 knows
that hundreds of thousands of civilians were executed by paramilitary killing squads.
Documents must be collected, and interviews conducted, to ascertain exact numbers,
dates, places, and identities of killers and killed. But this is not the area of dispute. The
dispute is about what the facts mean. Were the killings justified in the defense of a
democratic Indonesia? Are the killers the fathers and heroes of Indonesia’s democracy?
The official narrative, maintained through successive acts of discursive reconstruction
backed by the prestige and power of the government, answers these question in the
affirmative. The counter-narrative repudiates and deplores these rightness claims.

2. Indications of Indonesia’s Readiness for a Truth and Reconciliation Process from
Primary Source Materials
a. Conflict Transformation
Conflict resolution is not a linear process, but rather necessitates the initiation of
conflict management strategies that unfold in a way that is cognizant of social
inequalities and tensions (Maddison 58). Conflict is never really over or completely
resolved. It always finds new ways of expression. In a situation of impunity like
Indonesia’s, conflict is tangled in collusive relationships that benefit from governmental
support. The key to building stable societies is to develop relationships where collusion is
not tolerated, and forge strategies that allow conflict to be expressed without violence. As
stated by Maddison, reconciliation attempts unfold in contexts charged by “problematic
historical events” that are still very much alive in the cultural consciousness (57). It is
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clear from Oppenheimer’s films that the insistence that “the past is past” is, in fact, very
far from the truth. Laksmi Pamuntjak writes in The Guardian that since the fall of
Suharto in 1998, Indonesians have vigorously “indulged their new thirst for alternative
readings on 1965,” to whatever extent they have been able (Pamuntjak). Oppenheimer’s
films are one piece of a body of other texts, including literature and memoirs, that have
been created toward this goal.
As can be seen from the films, the events of 1965-66 in and of themselves are a
continuing source of damage caused by unresolved conflict. The unaddressed emotions
are repressed and give rise to hostility and fear. This is perhaps most clearly
demonstrated through the predication of the killings as a “wound” that is at once
historical and current. Kemat, the survivor, and one of death squad member Amir
Hasan’s sons, both use this term when talking about 1965. For Kemat to predicate his
own narrow escape from being murdered as a wound—that is, as something that has had
lasting and profound and negative impacts on his life and his community—is fitting. The
trauma of his close involvement is surely a painful and heavy wound. The mendacious
justification of so many murders must also be painful. But for Amir Hasan’s son, this use
of the word “wound” seems an interesting choice. Is the weight of this wound, which
both men claim (in spite of all evidence to the contrary) has “healed,” and is not in need
of reopening or disturbance, shared equally between them? Why do they both use this
word, when their experiences of history are so vastly different? It is clear that there are
lasting impacts from impunity and unreconciled divides between neighbors that harm
society across the borders of victim and perpetrator.
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The evidence of systemic violence, and the sense that the apparatus of
government will advantage the perpetrators and their supporters, but will disadvantage,
and exclude from all protection, the proponents of a challenger to the national narrative,
is made evident through the fact that Adi Rukun and his family had to be relocated after
The Look of Silence was made (Stevens). Adi’s queries into the past were made at a great
personal risk. Many of the Indonesian cast and crew members who worked on The Act of
Killing and The Look of Silence are “afraid to be openly associated with it,” and are listed
anonymously in the credits (Kwok “Movie, Books”). The ongoing persecution and
intimidation of survivors and their families has become structural, as has the conveyance
of the national narrative to a new generation. The climate surrounding the killings and
upholding Suharto’s narrative was tense. It was difficult for citizens in communities
impacted by the killings to speak out or express sympathy to victims due to Suharto’s
enduring anti-communist campaign and to the fear of being labeled as communists and
facing severe social repercussions (McGregor). Beginning in the 1980s, Suharto’s New
Order government implemented the so-called “Clean Environment Policy”—a set of
discriminatory practices that barred the children and grandchildren of those “allegedly
connected to the 30 September Movement” from working as teachers, lawyers,
journalists, civil servants, or members of the military (McGregor). In her closing
statements from the International People’s Tribunal in the Hague, Prosecutor Silke
Studzinsky applauded the courage of the survivors who “dared” to travel to the
Netherlands to testify about the original crimes, as well as facing discrimination and
stigmatization in contemporary Indonesian society (Studzinsky). It is likely that those
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who testified faced serious repercussions at home as a result of their involvement in the
tribunal.
Pamuntjak notes being taught—like Adi’s son, with “no room for other
interpretations”—that all Communists were atheists and enemies of the state, and that
“the defeat of the Indonesian Communist party was crucial to the survival of the nation”
(Pamuntjak). This construction, Pamuntjak says, has produced “a generation schooled in
silence and apathy” as well as “successive generations that are wholly ignorant” of their
own history (Pamuntjak). She references a survey published by the Jakarta Globe in
2009 which showed that “more than half of the respondents comprising university
students in Jakarta had never even heard of the mass killings of 1965-1966” (Pamuntjak).
The misrepresentation of this chapter of history constitutes a further, more subtle type of
aggression and violence. This can be seen in The Look of Silence when Adi’s son’s
teacher does not mention the killings that took place locally at the Snake River. Victims’
voices and experiences continue to be routinely ignored.
The trauma survives because it is intergenerational. This is seen in the ethnic
Chinese man’s response to portraying a communist suspect on the set of the killers’
movie in The Act of Killing. Recognizing the trauma that victims and survivors live with
daily in her closing statements from the tribunal, Studzinsky quotes Jean Améry, a
survivor of Auschwitz, who said: “Anyone who has been tortured remains tortured.
Anyone who has suffered torture will never again be at ease in the world. The
abomination of annihilation is never extinguished” (Studzinsky). The trauma of coming
face to face with the killers and torturers of one’s family members daily is an act of
violence. The widespread ignorance of crimes against humanity is an act of violence. The
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repression of counter-narratives and alternate tellings of history is an act of violence, and
it compounds this trauma on future generations of both victims and killers.
If Maddison’s theory that conflict does not cease, but simply continues after an
episode of catastrophic violence, is supported by the post-conflict situation in Indonesia,
then the next question is whether there are indications that the conflict is being
transformed. That is, is the conflict being brought into the political sphere where it can be
managed without violence? What does it mean, for example, that a government official
recently praised the paramilitary organization responsible for many of the executions for
doing what governments cannot? There is an implicit acknowledgement here that
democratic governments cannot engage in the killing of citizens without due process
provided in the context of authorized criminal justice processes. It seems clear that the
politicization of the conflict has not happened at all or is in its infancy. Here we have a
government official coming right out and saying— “this type of slaughter is necessary,
but it has to be done by paramilitaries, and you may be sure that we will support you
from a safe distance, and thank you afterwards, and that we will not hold you
accountable.”
Although a government commission in 2012 engaged in fact finding and wrote a
report, the government did not follow up with the institution of truth and reconciliation
processes. As Oppenheimer’s films demonstrate, the dominant narrative is still
substantially supported by the government. However, the narrative is not intractable. In
groundbreaking developments in April 2016, President Widodo instituted National
Symposium on the 1965 Tragedy which took place in Jakarta (Melvin). The symposium
may prove to be a first step toward a truth and reconciliation process. The strength of
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counter-narratives, tentative government initiatives, and the progress of unofficial
processes, indicate readiness and a path forward if the government elects to invest its
power, resources, and prestige in designing and implementing a process to transform the
conflict. Dialogue, memory and memorialization, apology and forgiveness, and
reconciliation are evolving informally on a small scale, primarily, but not exclusively, in
non-governmental arenas.

b. Dialogue
Adi goes to the homes of the killers to talk to them. He realizes they will not
initiate this discussion. He sees the path to revising the narrative as reliant on interaction
and communication. He positions himself as a humble and gentle person. He does not
demand that the killers admit to murdering his brother, offer him any form of
compensation, or leave town. Adi is not looking for revenge, but for ways to talk with
people in his own community who are deeply divided from one another based on which
side of the conflict they are on. This strategy is well-aligned with the process of dialogue
as a tool of conflict transformation. Dialogue transforms the way people in deeply
divided societies relate to each other (Maddison 225) by creating opportunities for
opposing parties to begin to learn how to understand one another differently and to
imagine new relational possibilities by speaking openly with one another (225).
Unfortunately, however, dialogue is not as simple as bringing victims and
perpetrators together to talk about the past and the ongoing conflict between them.
Constructive dialogue can only reach the goal of humanizing historical conflicts
(Maddison 216) if it is facilitated by government agencies. Further, dialogue must lead to
the implementation of concrete action, such as public policy revisions (Noriega, as qtd. in
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Maddison 267). This process depends on the patience and willingness of individuals,
communities, and government agencies to collaborate (269).
The process of initiating dialogue on a large scale about the catastrophe of 1965 in
Indonesia is rife with frequent setbacks. Journalists call for official apologies; citizen
groups such as the witnesses who testified in the Hague call for the international
community to nominate the massacres and predicate them as crimes against humanity;
some political bodies make statements about the crimes committed, but then others step
in to say that they see no need to address events long past. Worse still is the silence of
many political actors and institutions. Many Indonesians have been disappointed by
President Widodo, who promised in his election campaigns that he would take action
regarding the slaughter of 1965, but refused early in his administration to issue an official
apology to the victims (Pamuntjak). However, President Widodo recently took decisive
action by following up the first-ever governmentally-instituted symposium on the events
of 1965 with the authorization of a formal inquiry (Melvin). These steps may lead to
dialogue structured by the government, which would maximize the possibility of a
beneficial outcome.
At this point, non-governmental bodies have been active in trying to initiate
dialogue. Indeed, it seems like the starting place for dialogue so far is at the level of
individuals like Adi Rukun. Person-to-person interactions may be beneficial, and may
open a door to formally-instituted governmental truth and reconciliation processes. In an
interview with Dana Stevens of Slate, Oppenheimer quotes Adi as saying that meeting
the perpetrators is helpful because it can be a way for killers and victims to recognize
their shared humanity. Adi says that he hopes, in approaching the perpetrators as their

Mack 59

neighbor, “‘with empathy and an attempt to understand,’” he may be able to show the
killers that the victims were not one-dimensional sadists, but perhaps that they too were
gentle people who did not deserve to be massacred (Stevens). This realization may lead
perpetrators to recognize wrongdoing, and can be a starting point for apology and
forgiveness (Stevens). “‘Once they apologize,’” Adi says, “‘ I’ll be able to forgive them,
because I’ll be able to separate their crime from their humanity. Then we’ll be able to live
together as human beings and as neighbors instead of perpetrator and victim, afraid of
each other’” (Stevens).
Adi’s counter-narrative arises from his dialogue with killing squad members and
is contextualized in rhetorics of morality, “moral responsibility,” honesty, accountability,
and forgiveness (Silence). Every experience Adi has with the killers involves their
distancing themselves—“trying to wash [their] hands”—from any sort of responsibility
(Silence). So, perplexingly, while perpetrators will happily recount their actions killing,
beating, and interrogating suspected communists, none of them is willing to accept any
amount of moral responsibility to their community for executing innocent people. Adi
utilizes dialogue as a way of “opening” and revising a “distorted” history (Silence). By
opening history up for discussion, Adi believes that the community can come together to
make sense of it differently, in a way that recognizes the experiences of the marginalized
population. The strides Adi makes to initiate dialogue are courageous, yet they ultimately
fall short because they lack institutional support. Amir Siahaan, M.Y. Basrun, and one of
Amir Hasan’s sons all threaten Adi when he appears to be overstepping the boundaries
set by the dominant narrative, revealing their vulnerability to being re-predicated as
criminals (instead of as heroes) in a new narrative.

Mack 60

There are certain limits to what is attainable when dialogue is concentrated at the
level of individual interactions. Government agencies need to be involved. It is
unacceptable that attempts at revising the meaning of the commonly agreed upon facts,
such as in the report issued by the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas
HAM)—which deemed 1965 as a gross human rights violation—have been rejected by
some ministers and governmental agencies (Aritonang, “1965 Mass Killings”). The fact
that interactions such as those between Adi and the killers in his community are taking
place, the publication of books such as Laksmi Pamuntjak’s Amba and Leila S. Chudori’s
Pulang, which address the trauma of 1965 (Kwok, “Movie, Books”), as well as articles
and journalism calling for state action, are strong indications of readiness for dialogues to
take place on a larger scale. As discussed, recent actions by President Widodo may also
be indicative of readiness among Indonesia’s political elites (Melvin).

c. Memory and Memorialization
Challenging ahistorical national narratives of state-sanctioned violence and
creating new narratives, new tellings of history, is the first step to creating a shared vision
for how a society will deal with the aftermath of traumatic violence. At the root of
changing dominant, non-factual narratives is coming to a sense of agreement on how the
events will be remembered. This may require “revising pre-existing narratives” and
earlier experiences (Opotow 161). Establishing a shared narrative relies on constructive
dialogue, in which victims and perpetrators have space to articulate their experiences.
This is a “prerequisite for achieving accountability, meaningful reconciliation, and a
foundation for a common future” (Chapman, as qtd. in Maddison 49).
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A significant step that Indonesia’s government has taken to this end is the
Komnas HAM report. Over four years of research went into compiling a report that
ultimately deemed the events of 1965 as “state-sponsored gross human rights
violation[s]” (Aritonang, “National Commision”). This promising conclusion was
disappointingly rejected by the Coordinating Political, Legal, and Security Affairs
Minister Djoko Suyanto, who responded that “the mass killings were justified to save the
country from communism. The Attorney General said that the evidence [provided in the
report] was insufficient to justify a legal probe” (Kwok, “Movie, Books”). Suyanto also
stated that the country “would not be what it is today if [the killings] didn’t happen”
(Aritonang, “1965 Mass Killings”). It is clear that resistance to opening up about the
crimes does come at a cost for state actors and institutions that are implicated in them.
Understandably, they do not want to advance reports that counter their claims to rightful
authority. The wariness, defensiveness, and territoriality of government actors are part of
the ongoing manifestation of the untransformed conflict and are impediments to a truth
and reconciliation process in Indonesia. They are indicative of a continuing lack of will
and readiness on the part of many government actors to create and implement such a
project.
The amazing thing about Indonesia is that if President Widodo’s fledgling efforts
blossom into an authentic truth and reconciliation process, the “truth” processes
(dialogue, memory retrieval, and memorialization) will be relatively easy to implement.
Memory retrieval is not a problem where the killers have enjoyed impunity. Since the
killers don’t deny the facts, establishing a shared account of what happened, who was
involved, and when will be relatively simple. The question will be how the facts should
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be interpreted. The government still largely supports and protects proponents of the
narrative that the killings were part of a nation-building process; that the dead were
casualties of the creation of a democratic Indonesia. But there are also people articulating
a more nuanced version of the official story. Anwar has his doubts about the rightness of
what he did, for example. Although it is not clear if Anwar has taken any action resulting
from his experiences making The Act of Killing, Oppenheimer’s personal generosity and
openness to the killers is an approach that could provide a framework for embracing a
meaning for the facts that does not necessarily insist on revenge, punishment, or
stigmatization of the families of the killers.
The extent to which efforts have been made toward the public memorialization of
the crimes of 1965 still privileges the dominant narrative. A museum commemorating the
deaths of the generals has been built at Lubang Buaya, the site where their bodies were
discovered (McGregor). The Sacred Pancasila Monument additionally reconstructs the
narrative of the failed coup as a communist plot threatening the national ideology.
Commemorations for the massacre victims have yet to be undertaken, as the narrative to
which these efforts would correspond is still contested. The memorialization of the
successor narrative will entail dismantling some of these earlier memorialization efforts.
The shrine for the murdered generals does not need to be torn down, but the museum will
have to be rethought to curate exhibits telling an unsanitized story of government
engineering of mass executions with the complicity of various civil society actors. When
the government is ready to move forward, victim-centered memorialization suited to
Indonesia's situation, in which a vast number of paramilitary actors were complicit with
the army, could be designed. Dates and sites of mass murders are known. National days
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of remembrance could be declared in honor of the victims. Memorials of some kind, like
the stupas in Cambodia, could be erected at the sites of massacres. Gallery space could be
used for local artists to make and exhibit their own kind of response to the trauma.
Statues or monuments could be constructed in areas hardest hit by the violence. Local
artists could be commissioned to paint murals. These are steps like those undertaken in
countries around the world to create memorials that have a public presence and manifest
the adoption of a new narrative. Such memorials impact how people engage with and
remember the violence of their past. Large-scale projects requiring collaboration could be
particularly conducive to healing.

d. Apology and Forgiveness
Apologies are not just an act, but also a process “focused on the possibility of a
future relationship” (Verdeja, as qtd. in Maddison 226). Apology is meaningless if it is
not followed by decisive action. The Indonesian government has not facilitated projects
that draw victims and perpetrators together to build relationships forged through
“apology, forgiveness and individual and societal healing” (Maddison 225). But, as can
be seen in Oppenheimer’s films, nongovernmental processes provide an insight into how
ready people are to begin initiating processes of forgiveness, as well as of what form
apology and forgiveness processes might take. Forgiveness cannot be extracted from
survivors by pressure, but Adi’s willingness to go down this path may be an indication
that other victims are as well.
Apologies such as those offered by Samsir’s daughter and Amir Hasan’s wife are
valuable in that they seem to arise from a genuine feelings of remorse in response to the
facts of their beloved family members’ complicity in mass killings. Unfortunately, these
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apologies are also highly superficial and insufficient as a way of recognizing fault and
offering condolences. Amir Hasan’s wife, especially, offers her apology to Adi in a
moment of extreme tension. Her sons have just begun to threaten Adi and Oppenheimer.
She has already left the room crying during the interview because they don’t listen to her
insistence (despite incontrovertible evidence to the contrary) that she never knew about
her husband’s involvement in the murders. She apologizes not because she truly feels
sorry about lying, or about her husband’s actions, but because she is trying to placate a
hostile situation. Her apology carries little weight, not enough to constitute meaningful
reparation. Samsir’s daughter’s apology is a little more noteworthy, but both of these
apologies occur in the realm of person-to-person healing which, while valuable, does
little to change the larger situation.
A strong inclination to leave the past in the past, to avoid reopening old wounds; a
willingness to admit that wrongs occurred, while insisting that there’s nothing to be done
about it now; a fear that seriously challenging the official narrative might lead to a
renewal of violence—all are impediments to apology. Interestingly, while actual killing
squad members are generally hostile to the idea of apology, their family members
articulate mitigated versions of the national narrative which are less averse to apology.
On the whole, victims are interested in receiving apologies, as long as procuring them
does not lead to renewed victimization. At least some of them, such as Adi, would likely
answer even a marginally adequate apology with forgiveness.
There is an interesting moment in The Act of Killing when Adi Zulkadry
approaches the topic of apology and forgiveness with Anwar. The two are fishing
together, and Adi remarks that if he were the child of a communist killed in 1965-66, who
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had, as a result, lived a difficult life (due to the effects of deeply entrenched
institutionalized impunity and structural violence—limiting survivors’ access to
education, employment, legal services and protections, etc.), it would make sense for him
to be angry at the men who killed his father. “This needs to be changed,” Adi says (this
being the disenfranchisement of children and family members of murdered communists).
“There’s been no official apology—but what’s so hard about apologizing? The
government would apologize, not us. It would be like medicine. It would reduce the pain”
(Killing). Adi Zulkadry’s profound mitigation of the rightness claims of the national
narrative is thrilling because it is the only direct recognition voiced by any of the killers
that the retaliation they so fear from the children of their victims would be justified. Adi
perspectivizes himself remotely in his discourse about apology and reconciliation. He is
rightly conceiving of government action as the only real solution to a government
problem. Yet troublingly, Adi removes himself (and all other killers) from the process.
Adi is right in assuming that his actions alone would not be sufficient to start
processes of healing and forgiveness, but he falls short of realizing the integral role he
would need to play for these apologies to truly “reduce the pain.” An official government
apology must be accompanied by the perpetrators’ direct involvement for meaningful
conflict transformation, dialogue, apology, and reconciliation processes to take place.
Some indications of readiness to walk that path are shown by Anwar Congo, Amir
Hasan’s wife, and Samsir’s daughter. Apology is a process and need not be perfect in
order to support the politicization of the conflict. Conflict caused by the government and
self-servingly narrativized by the government is transformed when the government
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intervenes to substitute a more correct narrative and to bring the conflict into the political
sphere.
Various actors in the Indonesian government have attempted to initiate measures
addressing the conflict since the end of Suharto’s reign. President Bacharuddin Habibie,
for example, released all remaining political prisoners and ended the tradition of showing
the propaganda film on September 30th each year (McGregor). Habibie also promised
“revisions to school history textbooks that had previously encouraged hatred towards all
alleged communists” (McGregor). President Abdurrahman Wahid suggested lifting the
ban on communism and proposed judicial investigations into the killings of 1965-66
(McGregor). His suggestions were met with mass protests from Islamic groups across the
country (McGregor). In 2004, “the push for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission [...]
encompassing the 1965-66 killings gained momentum,” but in 2006 the project was
abandoned (McGregor). These efforts, as well as the commissioning of the Komnas
HAM report, illustrate the government’s capability to institute the necessary processes for
truth and reconciliation to begin to take place. Whether recent development in this
direction will bear fruit remains to be seen, but the importance of the National
Symposium on the 1965 Tragedy and the institution of an inquiry cannot be overstated
(Melvin).
Greater vision and leadership is needed to conceive of a process to bring former
enemies “into relationships with one another through apology, forgiveness and individual
and societal healing” (Maddison 225). An apology by the government to the victims and
their surviving family members would serve to open ‘political space’ in which ‘citizens
may reflect on more critical views of their troubled histories’” (226). Elite apologies are
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an important first step to instilling greater political stability (226). The power and
efficaciousness of official apologies will depend in part on the willingness of men like
Anwar Congo to personally apologize and seek forgiveness.

e. Reconciliation
“Recovering systematically repressed facts about the violent insult to the
community, followed by apology and forgiveness to the extent those are achievable,
opens a door to reconciliation” (Hamber and Kelly, as qtd. in Maddison 49-50). Hamber
and Kelly detail five elements that they see contained in reconciliation: “the development
of a shared vision of an interdependent and fair society; a means of acknowledging and
dealing with the past; the building of positive relationships; significant cultural and
attitudinal change; and substantial social, economic, and political change” (49-50).
Finding new ways to bring people together over barriers of “suspicion, prejudice and
inequality” (Villa-Vicencio as qtd. in Maddison 46) that are deeply historically
entrenched brings about reconciliation as an ongoing process.
The perpetrators of the killings in Indonesia may not ever distance themselves
from the rightness of their crimes. Fifty years of impunity, and of having their crimes
justified and their rightness claims argumentatively upheld not only by their own
communities and government, but by the international community as well, may have
irreversibly impacted the way the killers predicate themselves and their actions. As seen
in both of Oppenheimer’s films, perpetrators have no hesitation when it comes to aligning
themselves with what happened. They might feel conflicted about it, but on the whole
they all seem perfectly willing to recount the details of the past.
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The promise for conflict transformation may instead lie with the children and
grandchildren of death squad members. Children of killers, such as Amir Hasan’s sons or
Samsir’s daughter, seem to want to try to distance themselves from what happened. They
make attempts to mitigate their parents’ involvement in the killings (“we had no idea”,
“he never told us”). They offer apologies to Adi. They do not distance themselves from
the predications and rightness claims of the national narrative completely, but they do
seem to be trying to create some distance between themselves and the acts of the killings.
They talk about moving forward as a society. It is possible that these utterances, often the
result of duress, could be stepping stones to successfully challenging the narrative and
initiating accountability, apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation over time; in short, to
transforming the conflict by bringing it into a sphere in which the fear of a resumption of
unconstrained violence is banished.
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VII.

Conclusion
Clearly, the conflict which exploded in murderous rage abetted by government

actors in 1965 persists in Indonesia today in ways that are severely injurious and deeply
menacing. Truth and reconciliation is the only way forward for Indonesia. The
alternative, criminal justice processes, are unsuitable due to the sheer numbers of
perpetrators, the diffusion of responsibility, government authorization of killing squad
activities, the deaths of many primary architects of the policy of extermination, and the
cumulative effects of 50 years of impunity (Androff 1961-62). While any truth and
reconciliation process must be managed by the government, non-governmental actors
(such as Oppenheimer, Adi, citizens who testified at the People’s Tribunal in the Hague)
have shown that there is some readiness in the Indonesian community as well as a path
suited to the unique circumstances of Indonesia’s relationship to the catastrophic events
of 1965. Possibly as a result of these non-governmental processes, there are now also
signs of readiness among political elites at the highest level of national government, as
manifested by the recent Symposium on the 1965 Tragedy.
For conflict to be meaningfully and effectively transformed, processes aimed at
doing so must take into consideration how dialogues between victims and perpetrators
can take place with the support to lead to direct action. These efforts must also
contemplate the difficulty of coming to a consensus about the meaning of the killings as
an unjustifiable sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Indonesian lives. Apologies will
need to be coupled with action that in some way alleviates the suffering of family
members from the impacts of structural and indirect violence. Collusive relationships
must no longer be tolerated. Each of these is an enormous task. Disentangling corruption
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and impunity from the social fabric to make room for a new narrative and new venues for
conflict management is a process that requires the sustained effort of generations. One
certainty is that such behavior as Djoko Suyanto’s rejection of the Komnas HAM
findings and Vice President Kalla’s wholehearted support of Pemuda Pancasila
compound the problem and tend to negate advances produced by movements that seek
change. Recent actions taken by President Widodo show the way towards imagining and
implementing the necessary processes. Lasting, large-scale changes will never be realized
without an increasing commitment on the part of political elites. The call to the
international community to take full responsibility for their historical complicity and to
condemn these crimes may be one way of facilitating this transition.
Is Indonesia ready for a truth and reconciliation process to help rewrite the
narrative of the killings of 1965-66? At the level of the people, the answer seems to be
yes. Adi Rukun’s example is extraordinary, but not unique. People are speaking out about
the injustice through many means, writing and publishing books, attending screenings of
Oppenheimer’s films, accessing and creating journalism online, even going so far as to
take their stories to the Hague. These are huge steps in the process of seeking justice and
changing the way the conflict is expressed and remembered. The actions of individuals,
and of individuals working together, can have amazing transformative effects. Attention
must now focus on the government, which fosters the complicated collusive relationships
that allow for uncontested impunity. The effects of 50 years of impunity complicate the
elements active in Indonesia’s nascent process (dialogue; memory and memorialization;
apology and forgiveness; and reconciliation). The government will need to work with
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communities to reshape the cultural imagination of how the conflict is managed, and to
adequately redefine the role of violence in Indonesia going forward.
Ciorciari and Ramji-Nogales talk about the importance of neutral, non-political
ceremonies and rituals to facilitating healing and new ways of remembering historical
violence, noting that these rituals tend to be most effective when they are connected to
local cultural customs (215). This brings to mind a Muslim ritual of forgiveness and
acceptance that I witnessed while living in Jakarta as a student. After Ramadan, I joined
my classmates and teachers at school in the ritual of halal bi-halal. The name comes from
the Arabic “to accept” or “to forgive” (“Halal Bihalal”). Every person came face to face
with every other person. They bowed and touched hands in a sign of respect, asking
through this gesture for apology for any wrongs they may have committed and returning
by the same gesture acceptance and forgiveness.
While halal bi-halal is tied specifically to Muslim cultural practices, and thus
may be exclusive of Indonesian Christians and Buddhists, it is a culturally relevant ritual
that could provide a recognizable starting point at the onset of a truth and reconciliation
process in Indonesia. Halal bi-halal reveals a well-known path of truth and reconciliation
which is familiar to most Indonesians. There is every reason to expect from them a
beautifully conceived and implemented process that will succeed in revising the national
narrative, bridging the deep divides in Indonesian society, and transforming the conflict
in a way that will resonate with people in a culturally accessible way.
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VIII.
Appendices
Appendix A: Wodak and Reisigl’s Original Discourse-Historical Approach Outline
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Appendix B: Critical Discourse Analysis for The Act of Killing
Table 1: The Act of Killing
Questions

Discursive
Strategies

Purpose

How are persons, objects,
phenomena/events,
processes, and actions
named and referred to
linguistically?

Nomination
Strategies

Discursive Construction of Social Actors,
Objects/Phenomena/Events, Actions:
● Proper names: Anwar Congo,
Herman Koto, Adi Zulkadry, Jusuf
Kalla, Ibrahim Sinik
● Pronoun Use: ‘I’, ‘us’, ‘we’--group
identity further expressed through
appellations of ‘the people’ and ‘the
nation’--killers were defending the
nation’s democracy
● Events were necessary
● Ideological: communism, democracy,
preserving social order

What characteristics,
qualities, and features are
attributed to social actors,
objects, phenomena/events,
and processes?

Predication
Strategies

Discursive Characterization/Qualification
of Social Actors, Objects, Phenomena,
Events, Processes, and Actions:
● Killers: brave, heroic, courageous
national heroes
● Victims/Communists: weak,
suspicious, subversive, unworthy
● Sadistic (applied both to methods
used by killers and to the communists
who killed the 6 generals—justifying
cruelty by emphasizing cruelty of
others)
● Extraordinary events calling for
extraordinary action
● Salvation of Indonesia’s democracy
● Praise for free-man spirit of Pemuda
Pancasila
● Voices of victims emerge in
reenactments begging, pleading,
weeping—showing their own
perception of their innocence and of
the killers’ brutality
● Ethnic Chinese actor: predicating his
stepfather as deserving of death,
assassins as powerful and justified
● Women and children actors as
innocent victims, begging for mercy
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●
●

Oppenheimer: innocent victims,
perpetrators detached from their own
actions
Victim actors seeming to understand
that they deserved death in final
production number

Which arguments are
employed in the discourse in
question?

Argumentation
Strategies

Arguments supporting truth and
rightness claims of the dominant national
narrative:
● Kalla: heroic citizens doing what
needed to be done when gov’t alone
could not act
● Victim actors awarding Anwar with a
medal, thanking him for killing them—
supports killers as national saviors
Arguments countering truth and
rightness claims of the dominant national
narrative:
● Anwar admitting that he has
nightmares about the killings, that he
killed people who did not want to die
● Ethnic Chinese actor’s emotional
outburst challenging narrative by
predicating killers as ruthless villains,
illuminating his victimization and fear

From what perspective are
these nominations,
attributions, and arguments
expressed?

Perspectivization
Strategies

Involvement:
● Most killers are willing to express
intimate involvement
● Ibrahim Sinik telling the crew that he
smeared names of suspects so that
everyone would hate them
● Ibrahim Sinik saying that he got to
choose who lived and who died
Distance:
● Ethnic Chinese actor: perspectivizes
himself as allied with his communist
stepfather
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Are the respective utterances
articulated overtly, are they
intensified or mitigated?

Mitigation and
Intensification
Strategies

Mitigation:
● Anwar: admitting to drinking and
taking drugs to cope, admitting that
he has nightmares
● Anwar stopping the interrogation
scene short of breath, wondering if
he just experienced what his victims
felt
Intensification:
● Kalla at a public, open air rally,
praising the ability of gangsters to get
things (i.e., killing civilians) done
● Kalla praising Anwar and others in a
large open venue
● Oppenheimer: assuring Anwar his
victims felt worse than he could
possibly imagine
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Appendix C: Critical Discourse Analysis for The Look of Silence
Table 2: The Look of Silence
Questions

Discursive
Strategies

Purpose

How are persons, objects,
phenomena/events,
processes, and actions
named and referred to
linguistically?

Nomination
Strategies

Discursive Construction of Social Actors,
Objects/Phenomena/Events, Actions:
● Killings referred to as the
proceedings of politics by Amir
Siahaan, M.Y. Basrun
● Pronoun use: ‘us’ ‘They’ ‘We’--both
killers and victims express collective
identity
● Adi calls killers ‘murderers’ and his
‘neighbors’
● Amir Siahaan calls communists
‘subversive’ to the social order
● One of Amir Hasan’s sons says that
everyone in the community—victims
and killers alike—are friends
● Victims said to have screamed for
help
● Kemat refers to victims on the banks
of Snake River as “friends” and
“family”

What characteristics, qualities, Predication
and features are attributed to
Strategies
social actors, objects,
phenomena/events, and
processes?

Discursive Characterization/Qualification
of Social Actors, Objects, Phenomena,
Events, Processes, and Actions:
● Adi: seeking honesty
● Killers predicate events as just and
correct
● Amir Siahaan: role in death squad
was revolutionary, essential to
formation of democracy
● School Teacher: communists were
ruthless and cruel
● Killers’ “heroic struggle”
● NBC News Report: families were
liquidated in a purge lasting 16
months
● Inong and Amir Hasan talking about
the historic killings at Snake River,
communists as enemies
● Samsir’s daughter asking Adi to
forgive them, think of them as family
● Killings referred to as a wound both
by Kemat and one of Amir Hasan’s
sons

Mack 79

●

Adi: “opening” and revising a
“distorted” history

Which arguments are
employed in the discourse in
question?

Arguments supporting truth and
Argumentation Strategies rightness claims of the dominant
national narrative:
● Amir Siahaan saying that killers
should be rewarded with a cruise to
America since they played a role in
international politics
● NBC News Report celebrates the
killings—single biggest defeat
handed communism
● NBC News Report: Balinese villager
saying the communists realized they
were wrong and asked to be killed
● Amir Hasan and Inong: agents of
revolution
Arguments countering truth and
rightness claims of the dominant
national narrative:
● Amir Hasan and Inong: saying that
Ramli was ‘probably’ a good
person—not a one dimensional
villain, but someone who had to be
killed in the context of political
revolution
● Families of killers quickly step away
from direct involvement—the Hasan
family all say they’ve never seen the
book their father wrote before, that
they never knew he was involved
because he never talked about it

From what perspective are
these nominations,
attributions, and arguments
expressed?

Perspectivization
Strategies

Involvement:
● Most killers readily associate
themselves closely to the killings.
They are eager to talk about the
roles they had. They understand that
many people know that they were
involved in the killings to some
extent
● Amir Hasan writing and illustrating a
book to bring the events to life
Distance:
● Samsir’s daughter says she never
knew about her father’s involvement
in the killings—so do Amir Hasan’s
wife and sons
● Hasan family attempt to disengage
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●
●
●
Are the respective utterances
articulated overtly, are they
intensified or mitigated?

IX.

Works Cited

Mitigation and
Intensification
Strategies

from discussion about their father’s
filmed admission of his role as a
killer
Killers back away from direct
involvement when met with the direct
relative of a victim
Although intimately involved, Kemat
distances himself, says it’s not for
him to punish the perpetrators
Rohani distances herself, showing
that the conflict is not really over

Mitigation:
● Amir Hasan and Inong mimicking
Ramli’s cries for help before they
killed him
● Samsir and Inong both talk about
drinking blood to keep from going
crazy, that many killers killed so
many they went crazy
Intensification:
● Adi directly challenges killers who
attempt to place responsibility on
someone else, maintains that they
are guilty, that what they did to his
brother and to many others was a
crime
● Adi countering the lesson his son
learns in school as a lie
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